Legal Issues Regarding the Legislation for an Emission Trading System in Korea by Cho, Hong Sik
Legal Issues Regarding the Legislation for
an Emission Trading System in Korea*
Hong Sik Cho**
Abstract
This paper will study the potential legislative issues that can be raised in the process of
creating an emission trading system. 
First, the constitutionality of carbon credits can be questioned in relation to the freedom to
choose an occupation and property rights. Second, Emission trading might be regarded as a way
of granting the right to pollute, which is a violation of environmental rights. Third, the “polluter
pays principle” (PPP), stipulated under the Framework Act on Environmental Policy, might be
inconsistent with an ETS targeting only the upstream pollution sources.
Fourth, the problem of determining the period(short-term or long-term) and the reduction
amount and the target gases. Fifth, to whom the emission credits should be allocated. Sixth, to
choose between different methods to allocate emission allowances: free allocation (grand-fathering
and benchmarking (baseline and credit)) and paid allocation (auctioning). 
Seventh, given the regulatory gap on emissions among countries, Korea should come up with
countermeasures against the negative impact on the international competitiveness of its domestic
industry and potential carbon leakage in the world that could be caused by domestic regulations.
Eighth, it is crucial to be open to other various policy tools such as command-and-control,
environmental taxes, subsidies, support for technology development and the readjustment of the
social infrastructure, and to adopt a policy-mix method that uses a combination of these various
tools.
Ninth, the regulatory consequences of implementing an ETS can be a huge burden on those
in the industry. To minimize the regulatory burden, the following legal basis will be needed to
allow a gradual implementation of the regulation.
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I. The Background and History of the Emission Trading
System in Korea
Korea is currently the 10th largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world.1)
Its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have sharply increased since the 1990s,
which can largely be attributed to its manufacturing-based economic growth.
Between 1990 and 2005, GHG emissions in Korea increased by 86.8%, which
was the largest increase in emissions during that period among the OECD
countries.2) This stems from the fact that the Korean economy has an energy-
intensive industrial structure and a high level of dependency on fossil fuels.
As of 2006, energy-intensive industries including steel, cement and the
petrochemical industries accounted for 8% of the entire industrial structure in
Korea,3) far exceeding both Japan and the United States, where these
industries accounted for 4.6% and 3.1%, respectively.4) In addition, the average
fuel efficiency of domestically manufactured and sold vehicles was 11 km/l in
2007, which is only 70% compared to that of Japanese vehicles.5) Meanwhile,
the development of the green industry and technology, which is pivotal for
GHG emissions reductions, is rather poor in Korea. For example, the
distribution rate of new and renewable energy sources was a mere 2.37% in
2007, the lowest among OECD member states.6)
Since climate change is a global environmental issue, global cooperation
plays a vital role in its resolution. Major emitting countries are working
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1) Editorial: Achieving Overwhelming Goal of Greenhouse Gas Reduction, MAEIL BUSINESS
NEWSPAPER, available at http://media.daum.net/foreign/englishnews/view.html?cateid=
1047&newsid= 20091118104716996&p=mk.




5) The Press Release from the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, available at http://blog.
daum.net/mocie/15610034.
6) Economy Focus 1, INVEST KOREA JOURNAL (Issue Nov-Dec 2009), available at http://www.
ikjournal.com/InvestKoreaWar/work/journal/content/content_main.jsp?code=4650104&selec
t1=465&select2=4650104&query=&gubun=; State Strategy to Green Growth, available at http://
www.greengrowth. go.kr/download.ddo?fid=bbs&bbs_cd_n=12&bbs_seq_n=149&order_
no_n=2 p.13.
together to develop and maintain an international framework under which
they share the roles and responsibilities for fighting climate change. Though
Korea is not bound by the mandatory emission cuts of the Kyoto Protocol, it
can no longer free-ride on the efforts of other nations under the excuse of
being a developing country, given that Korea is eager to improve its position
in the international community and has a high dependency rate on trade. In
fact, the international community seems hopeful that Korea will exert greater
efforts in reducing GHG emissions compared to other developing nations.
Moreover, the possibility that Korea may be included among Annex I
countries in the post-Kyoto Protocol era cannot be ruled out.
Under these circumstances, the Korean government has begun to develop
legislation for reducing GHG emissions. The government has embraced the
“low-carbon, green-growth” paradigm as the new national development
framework. This framework aims to create new growth engines and job
opportunities by moving away from the carbon-based development strategy
and instead moving towards green technology and clean energy. The new
paradigm also means the achievement of sustainable development by
reducing GHG emissions and environmental pollution. The government has
drafted the Basic Act on Low Carbon and Green Growth [Jeotanso
Noksaekseongjang Kibonbeopan] which is currently under deliberation in the
National Assembly. Article 46 of the Act specifies the basis for an emission
trading system (ETS) as follows:7)
Article 46 (Introduction of Cap-and-Trade System, etc.) 
In order to prepare for the globally expanding emission trading
market and to efficiently reduce greenhouse gases through a market
mechanism, the government may implement a system, etc.; the system
sets a limit or cap on the amount of a greenhouse gas that can be
emitted and allows the emission allowance to be traded (hereinafter
referred to as a “cap-and-trade system”).
The government shall take into account international
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7) JEOTANSO NOKSAEKSEONGJANG KIBONBEOPAN [Basic Act on Low Carbon and Green
Growth], Nat’l Assembly, Draft No. 3967 (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://likms.assembly.go.
kr/bill/jsp/BillDetail.jsp?bill_id=PRC_G0I9I0O2X2U71O8S2Q0M3U0I6B9A4.
negotiations relating to climate change, international competitiveness,
etc. when implementing a cap-and-trade system.
Allocation methods, the registration and management of
greenhouse gas emission allowances, and the establishment and
operation of an exchange for implementing a cap-and-trade system
shall be prescribed by separate acts. 
Moreover, according to Korea’s Strategy and Five-Year Plan for Green
Growth set by the Presidential Committee on Green Growth on July 6, 2009,
the government will implement a trial cap-and-trade system until 2011 and
gradually introduce the system in 2012.8)
The cap-and-trade system, however, has gained only limited support.
Those in the industry argue that the ETS will discourage new investments,
hike costs of production, and drive the manufacturing sector abroad. They
added that the government should provide more support to enhance national
competitiveness instead of imposing regulation on the industry.9) On the other
hand, environmental groups criticized the government, asserting that the
word “etc.” in paragraph (1) of Article 46 of the Basic Act allows the
introduction of methods other than a cap-and-trade system.10)
This paper will study the potential legislative issues that can be raised in
the process of creating an emission trading system, based on the background
behind the introduction of the ETS.
II. Criteria and Constraints in Designing an Emission
Trading System
Two factors should be considered when designing an emission trading
system: first, the regulative ideal or standard that controls the system design;
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8) Myung-je Chung, Gov’t to Inject W107 Trillion into Green Growth Sector for 5 Years, KOREA
IT TIMES, July 9, 2009, available at www.greengrowth.org/download/2009/news/Korea-inject-
107-trillion.pdf.
9) Ellee Park, Tteugeoun Gamja ‘Chongryangjehan Tansobaechulkwon Georaeje’ Nollan Gayeol
[Heated debate over ‘cap-and-trade system’], MEDICAL TODAY, June 15, 2009, available at http://www.
mdtoday.co.kr/mdtoday/index.html?no=86166. 
10) Id.
and second, national conditions that restrict the design of such a system. The
former is an aggressive and universal factor while the latter is a passive and
parochial factor.
First, we need to consider the standard that controls the design phase of
the ETS. Various policy tools are available for the policy goal of cutting GHG
emissions. In order to select the ETS, its effectiveness in reducing GHG
emissions should be guaranteed. International environmental treaties such as
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Kyoto Protocol are not self-executing treaties that automatically take effect in
Korea as domestic law. Instead, each signatory must enact and enforce
domestic laws to meet its obligations under the treaty. Moreover, once a
country signs and ratifies a treaty, it cannot avoid implementing and
complying with the treaty obligations because of its domestic conditions.
Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that Korea, which is expected to be a
member of the post-Kyoto Protocol, design an effective ETS that guarantees
successful achievement of the reduction targets.
Another important concept in designing an ETS is cost-effectiveness.
Under the ETS, an emitter must purchase credits to emit carbon so that the
entire community can meet the reduction target at a low cost. By putting a
price on emissions, the ETS encourages emitters to search for inexpensive
alternatives to purchasing carbon credits. Then, through the carbon credit
trade, emitters may purchase carbon credits from other emitters who have
reduced carbon emissions at a lower cost. As such, the ETS aims to promote a
cost-effective way of cutting GHG emissions. The cost-effectiveness approach
can be understood as attaining the goal of emissions reduction at a low cost by
guaranteeing emitters flexibility when choosing GHG emissions reduction
methods. In addition, the focus on cost can encourage technological
development. As the price of carbon credit increases, highly efficient
technologies will be introduced and by setting a proper long term goal,
further technological development will be stimulated.
Next, we will review the passive factors that restrict the ETS. From an
economic perspective, Korea’s heavily coal-intensive industrial structure
prevents an immediate introduction of an ETS. Therefore, the gradual
adoption of an ETS must be considered. Moreover, there is no emission-
related statistic data, which is necessary for the implementation of an ETS.
Without access to such data, designing a regulatory system and providing
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subsidies will be impossible. Considering that data collection requires much
time and cost, various policy measures for facilitating data collection need to
be legislated. For instance, regulations that protect companies’ confidential
information need to be legislated.
From a socio-cultural perspective, since Koreans have a strong sense of
protecting their rights, there may be a conflict in the initial distribution of
carbon credits. Korean society is no longer perceived as a non-litigious society,
as evidenced by the rising number of lawsuits, including civil and adminis-
trative cases.11) In the past, the distribution of carbon credits may not have
caused any difficulty, since it could be carried out through an agreement
between an authoritarian government and passive companies. However,
today, highly self-conscious citizens, grass-root civic groups and bold
companies are ready to fight for their rights. Especially considering the
redistribution effects of an ETS, we can imagine the massive social impact that
these controversies will bring about. Therefore, in designing an ETS, it is
pivotal that the interested parties participate in the legislation process and all
parties share the responsibilities fairly, preventing any unfair attainment of
initial credits. Also, a transition period should be granted before implementing
a full-scale ETS in order to minimize the adverse effects.
From a legislative perspective, the Korean Constitution declares that “all
people have the right to live in a healthy and pleasant environment.”12) It is
well-known that, in Europe, there is a heated debate over the constitutionality
of carbon credits in relation to the freedom to choose an occupation and
property rights. In the same vein, emission trading may be regarded as a way
of granting the right to pollute, which is a violation of environmental rights in
Korea. In addition, the “polluter pays principle” (PPP) is stipulated under the
Framework Act on Environmental Policy.13) Accordingly, an ETS targeting
upstream pollution sources would be inconsistent with the PPP. Furthermore,
the ETS has several factors that conflict with other environmental adminis-
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http://elaw.klri.re.kr/.
trative laws and regulations. To solve such problems, careful fine-tuning of
the provisions is required and a separate regulation on the execution and
management of the ETS should specify the implementation procedures of the
ETS. For example, a task force or procedure can be established for resolving
conflicts between the ETS and other environmental administrative laws. 
III. Legal Issues in Designing an Emission Trading System
Legal issues in designing the ETS can be divided into internal issues which
constitute the details of the ETS and external issues which determine the
success of the ETS. 
The most basic internal issue is to determine “how much of what should
be reduced until when.” In other words, the period (short-, mid-(post-Kyoto
period, 2013-2020) and long-term (2021-2050)), the reduction amount and the
target gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6) should be decided. With
regard to these factors, rules on compliance with reduction obligations such as
the compliance period, depreciation obligations and measures for non-
compliance should be in place. Such rules on compliance are of utmost
significance because they serve as the precondition for emission rights and
trade. On August 4, 2009, the Korean government announced its goal to
reduce GHG emissions by 30% until 2020, relative to the so-called “business as
usual” (BAU) scenario.14) The BAU refers to the level of GHG emissions the
country is forecasted to reach by a certain year if emissions grow at their
current pace. The social debate with regard to this announcement shows the
importance of deciding the reduction amount. Above all, a social agreement
should be sought.
Another issue is deciding to whom the emission credits should be
allocated. Once the allocation subjects are decided, industrial sectors and types
of businesses to be covered by the ETS and their portions of the total emissions
in Korea can be determined. For instance, it must be determined whether
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&order_no_n= 3.
those in the upstream — including producers, importers and sellers of fuels —
or those in the downstream — including energy users (producers or users of
power) — can receive the emission credits. Once the allocation subjects of the
emission credit are decided, the method of allocating those credits should be
determined in a “fair” manner. Fairness is crucial for the success of the ETS
since the participants will support the system only when it is implemented in
a fair way. 
There are two different methods to allocate emission allowances: free
allocation (grand-fathering and benchmarking (baseline and credit)) and paid
allocation (auctioning). The above-mentioned issues relating to the
Constitution and the PPP will be discussed with regard to the allocation
methods. Measures against those who take early action should be sought as
well. Also, issues regarding new business operators and facility closure need
to be reviewed. These issues depend on the legal definition of property rights.
For instance, if the emission credit is regarded as a civil liberty, there shall be
no barriers for new businesses to enter the market, while if the credit is
regarded as a property right, a company which shuts down its facilities
should receive emission credits equivalent to the reduced emission. 
The internal infrastructure for implementing the ETS includes the
establishment of a registry for emission credits and the adjustment of rules on
“monitoring, estimating and reporting of emissions” and “verification of
emissions” for measuring the exact amount of emissions. This issue also
depends on the legal definition of emission credits. For example, it should be
determined whether the credit shall be regarded as movable property or
immovable property, and if it is regarded as movable property, whether the
establishment of a right of pledge shall be permitted or not. 
In addition to designing of the ETS, cost-alleviating measures such as
banking, borrowing, price caps, overseas credits, etc. should be established by
taking into account the adverse effects that price spikes and fluctuations can
have on the economy. This is to promote price stability and avoid a sudden
rise in costs, while maintaining the goal of reducing GHG emissions, by
introducing measures that flexibly increase the supply of emission credits in
the event of a price spike or an imbalance between supply and demand. 
In addition, given the regulatory gap on emissions among countries, Korea
should come up with countermeasures against the negative impact on the
international competitiveness of its domestic industry and potential carbon
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leakage in the world that could be caused by domestic regulations. In this
regard, free allocation to certain sectors and adjustment of reduction
obligations among countries (so-called “border adjustments”) may be
considered. 
Lastly, possible interdependencies between domestic and international
ETSs should be reviewed. International trade of emission credits would cause
a short term outflow of funds to countries that can reduce emissions at a low
cost. Such a problem, if the amount involved is enormous, could lead to a
political issue. Moreover, the increase of trade volume and participants due to
global linkages may undermine the control of each government. Hence, rules
that can be applied to international emission credit transactions should be
established.
External factors that will serve as the basis for the ETS are two-fold: one is
rules on accounting and taxation, which will regulate the allocation and trade
of emission credits. The other is the establishment of a foundation that
facilitates transactions and an appropriately functioning market, so that
efficient reduction of emissions can be achieved through price signals.
Accounting and taxation standards are highly likely to converge globally as
ETSs become a global system. Any divergence from international accounting
standards should be eliminated by observing the developments at the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). For the facilitation of
emissions trade, it is important that sufficient participants are secured and
institutional support is provided to encourage the creation of brokers.
Additionally, measures should be taken to secure the credibility and stability
of the transactions. 
IV. Some Proposals: Policy Mix and Incremental
Implementation
As mentioned previously, it is necessary to jump over various legal
hurdles in order to implement an ETS in Korea. To that end, it is crucial to be
open to other various policy tools such as command-and-control,
environmental taxes, subsidies, support for technology development and the
readjustment of the social infrastructure, and to adopt a policy-mix method
that uses a combination of these various tools. For instance, a mix of
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command-and-control and the tax system would be useful for monitoring and
verifying a large number of small-sized emitters. Also, even when the cost of
purchasing emission allowances is cheaper than the cost for reducing
emissions, subsidies can be offered for the goal of nurturing the technologies
and industries which are essential for future reductions. 
The regulatory consequences of implementing an ETS can be a huge
burden on those in the industry. To minimize the regulatory burden, the
following legal basis will be needed to allow a gradual implementation of the
regulation. 
In the first phase, the industry should be able to voluntarily come up with
an action plan. Such voluntary action plans would be cost-effective and
politically acceptable, due to their autonomous nature. If there is concern that
this would result in laissez-faire in the industry, a voluntary agreement could
be an alternative. A voluntary agreement refers to an agreement that the
industry can enter into with the government, under which companies would
submit their GHG emissions reduction plans to the government. Then the
government or a third party would manage, approve and evaluate the
reduction process.
The second phase combines a tax system on GHG emissions — mainly a
carbon tax — and the voluntary agreement. For the successful operation of the
agreement, incentives are needed to encourage companies to voluntarily
participate. Simultaneously, there should be disincentives for companies that
fail to meet their reduction targets as arranged under the agreement. To
establish such an incentive system, first, taxes would be imposed on GHG
emissions while participants to the agreement receive tax reductions. Second,
those who fail to comply with the agreement will be deprived of the tax
reduction or be levied a heavier tax. The tax system alone may be insufficient
since it is difficult to set a specific tax rate. In this regard, a combination of the
tax system with the voluntary agreement can help set the tax rate. As a result,
a national plan for cutting GHG emissions can be successfully implemented. 
Under the third phase, signatories to the agreement can take part in
emission trading. Tax reductions for the signatories may hamper the efficient
distribution of resources. Such a problem can be minimized by allowing them
to trade emissions. The combination of an emission trading system and the
agreement can help avert the allocation issues and promote political ac-
ceptability in the form of an agreement. Those who emit moderate or large
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amounts of greenhouse gases can turn from the second phase to the third
phase, while those who emit small amounts can be subject to tax incentives.
This is because substantial costs will be incurred for monitoring compliance
with emission limitations.
In addition, it would be appropriate to employ command-and-control and
subsidies in a limited manner, such as when technological innovation is called
for.
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